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ABSTRACT 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Institutions and 
Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Indonesia* 
 
Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys, this paper studies the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation in Indonesia on local public spending across communities with different 
types of local institutions. Our results provide evidence of heterogeneity in access to public 
goods across communities in the period prior to fiscal decentralisation; with significantly 
greater spending on schools and health centres in communities which observe traditional 
adat laws (which promote an ethic of mutual cooperation), and less spending on roads, public 
transport, communications etc. in communities which have a democratic electoral system. 
Fiscal decentralisation led to an increase in the share of spending on physical infrastructure, 
as well as a convergence in spending across communities with different types of local 
institutions. We develop a theoretical model to argue that communities which enjoy a higher 
level of mutual cooperation would benefit less from investment in public goods which facilitate 
communication and exchange with outsiders – as these improve the outside options of 
community members and therefore makes it more difficult to sustain intra-community 
cooperation. Surprisingly, investment in communications and transport infrastructure in these 
communities were more restrained during the period of centralised fiscal control. 
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1 Introduction
The delivery of public goods and services to poor people remains a signicant challenge in many developing
countries today (World Bank 2004a). Decentralisation has been identied by many as an important policy
reform that has the potential of improving public service delivery. It is a political decision of national
leadership that devolves political, scal and/or administrative powers to local government. It has been argued
that scal decentralisation makes government more responsive and e¢ cient, and that it also strengthens the
voice of the poor and the marginalised. However, its success has not been uniform; Bardhan and Mukherjee
(2000) highlight the problem of elite capture in a decentralised set up.
Since scal decentralisation provides greater decision-making power to local governments, its impact on
public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the quality and nature of local institutions. The relevant
local institutions should not only include the formal processes through which communities make collective
decisions regarding public spending, but also the informal institutions which facilitate economic exchange
and maintain law and order within the community. These local institutions can vary enormously across
and within developing countries, and therefore it is important to understand how they mediate the e¤ects
of scal decentralisation. In this context, we raise the following questions. In a setting where communities
enjoy some degree of politcal autonomy, (i) do informal norms and formal institutions inuence the choice
of local public goods? And, (ii) how does the introduction of scal decentralisation impact upon the choice
of local public goods?
This paper attempts to bring both theoretical insights and empirical evidence to this under-researched
topic. We develop a theoretical model to derive the optimal choice of public goods in communities which rely,
in varying degrees, on informal sanctions to maintain cooperation in economic exchange among community
members. We argue that public goods which facililate communication and exchange with outsiders (such as
roads, public transport, telephone facilities, etc.) will improve the outside options of community members and
therefore make it more di¢ cult to sustain intra-community cooperation. Therefore, the greater the existing
level of mutual cooperation, ceteris paribus, the less the community should invest in such infrastructure
compared to other public goods which do not directly improve communication and trade links with the
outside world (such as schools and health centres).
We use data on local public spending in Indonesia from two rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(1997 and 2007) to compare the nature of public investments across communities which vary in terms of
the importance of traditional, informal institutions (specically, adat laws) promoting an ethic of mutual
cooperation. Fiscal decentralisation laws were introduced in Indonesia in 2001 and, therefore, the two
rounds of data also provides an opportunity to study how decentralisation impacted upon public spending in
communities with di¤erent types of local institutions. The socially optimal level of spending, derived from
our theoretical model, provides a benchmark for comparison.
We take the share of the central governments direct contribution in a communitys public spending
budget as a measure of centralised scal control for that community. This share declined, broadly, across
Indonesian communities following decentralisation. However, the decentralisation laws introduced a scal
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needs formulafor the transfer of funds from the central government based on geographic and demographic
characteristics; such that the central governments share fell by less in coastal, rural, more populous, and
geographically larger communities. We exploit this variation to estimate the impact of scal decentralisation
on local public spending across communities with di¤erent types of formal and informal institutions. To
ensure that our ndings are robust, we also estimate the impact of decentralisation on access to public
goods, and repeat the analysis with communities which did not experience any institutional change at the
local level between 1997 and 2007.
Our results provide evidence of heterogeneity in access to public goods  as well as heterogeneity in
investment in di¤erent types of public goods across communities in the period prior to scal decentralisation.
There was signicantly greater spending on schools and health centres (which we collectively call social
goods) in communities which observe traditional adat laws (relative to those that do not), and less spending
on roads, public transport, communications etc. (which we collectively call physical infrastructure) in
communities which have a democratic electoral system (relative to those that do not). Moreover, scal
decentralisation led to an increase in the share of spending on physical infrastructure, as well as a convergence
in spending across communities with di¤erent types of local institutions.
We nd that (the share of) spending on physical infrastructure is lower in traditional adat communities,
compared to non-adat communities during the period of centralised scal control, and that this di¤erence
disappears in the period following decentralisation. This is contrary to expectations as it suggests that the
potential adverse e¤ects of improving links with the outside world for close-knit communities were taken
into consideration in local public spending decisions before but not after scal control was devolved to
local authorities. We suggest the possibility that community leaders were able to bargain more e¤ectively
with the central government and push for policies that would maximise community welfare during the period
of centralised scal control; and that this became more di¢ cult following decentralisation when community
members were, at least in some instances, able to vote, secretly and individually, for policies of their choice.
Our results are closely related to, and contribute to, various strands of the literature, including: (i) the
literature on democracy and growth which argues that democracy is associated with higher rates of economic
growth (e.g. Barro 1996); (ii) the political economy literature on public goods provision under di¤erent forms
of democracy, including di¤erent methods for apportioning votes, parliamentary versus presidential regimes
(Persson and Tabellini, 2004), and variations in term limits and voter registration rules (Besley and Case,
2003); (iii) the political economy of public goods provision in developing countries, which identies the
role of community leader characteristics on public goods provision, e.g. caste (Pande, 2003), gender (Duo
and Chattopadhyay, 2004), and the wealth of elected legislators (Besley et al., 2005); (iv) a literature on
scal decentralisation and development, which highlights the lack of capacity of local governments (Akin,
Hutchinson, and Strump, 2001), misaligned responsibilities arising from incomplete decentralisation (e.g.,
Devarajan, 2005) and elite capture (Bardhan and Mukherjee, 2000) and (v) an emerging literature on
cultures, institution and development (Platteau 2000; Guiso et al. 2006), which highlights the role of social
norms and cultural factors in economic development.
We are not aware of any research that explicitly examines the role of institutions, both formal and
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informal, on public goods provision at the community-level, or the impact of scal decentralisation across
communities with di¤erent types of local institutions. This is an important exercise as access to public goods
and infrastructure is understood to be central to economic growth and an important source of heterogeneity
in the levels of development across nations and regions. History reveals that informal governance based
on personal relations is the precursor to the more formal modes of governance made necessary by ever-
increasing specialisation and division of labour. Therefore, an understanding of how informal and formal
institutions interplay is essential for an understanding of the process of economic development. Our results
identify the di¤erential e¤ects of informal and formal institutions on the choice of social goods and physical
infrastructure.
The paper is developed as follows. In 2, we provide an overview of central government policy in Indonesia
in its dealings with local communities; to provide the context for our theoretical and empirical analysis. In
Section 3.1, we discuss the theoretical literature which provides a starting point for our model on local
public goods expenditures. The model is presented in sections 3.2 to 3.6, and its implications for scal
decentralisation are discussed in Section 3.7. Section 4 provides a description of the data and the econometric
specications used in our analysis. The econometric results are discussed in section 5, and we consider possible
explanations to account for the results in Section 5.3. Our conclusions are presented in section 6.
2 Background on the Soeharto Regime and Fiscal Decentralisa-
tion in Indonesia
At the start of the process of scal decentralisation in 2001, Indonesia was characterised by substantial
heterogeneity in its local institutions. We provide a brief description of Soehartos New Order regime, which
lasted from 1966 to 1998, to explain the nature and source of this heterogeneity. This background will
motivate the theoretical model in Section 3 as well as help interpret our empirical ndings in Section 4.
During the New Order Period, Soeharto established a strongly unitary state and acted to enforce territor-
ial claims over much of Indonesia. Rejecting Sukarnos socialist legacy, Soeharto made a U-turn on economic
policy, embracing an unfettered capitalism. He supported national entrepreneurship to build big businesses,
which in turn led to rapid development of urban centres. A clear distinction was made between rural and
urban communities through the Village Law of 1979. While leaders of rural communities were elected or
nominated by local people, urban community leaders were to be appointed by the central government.
The New Order regime was dedicated to maintaining political order, promoting economic development,
and excluding mass participation from the political process. The military had a strong role in politics and the
regime opted for a selective but e¤ective and sometimes brutal repression against its opponents, most notably
the communists. A number of seats in the Parliament were set aside for the military under the dwifungsi
(dual function) doctrine. Thus, Soeharto made way to a dictatorial government, backed by the army and
a co-opted elite. The armed services took over much of the economy, with senior o¢ cers often getting the
government contracts, property deals and nationalised industries. Very often this involved ownership or a
cut of prots rather than direct management.
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The regime placed clear emphasis on Indonesian identity over regional/ethnic identity, which threatened
many ethnic groups including the adat communities (which observed and practised their own local customary
laws and traditions). In order to bring the adat communities under central government, there have been
signicant changes in property rights in land and other natural resources. Even though the state did not
formally own all of the free land, the notion of state-controlled land was emphasized during this period.
The state resumed exclusive authority over all territories classied as forest area including all aspects of
human activities within them. Local customary institutions were marginalised, replaced or co-opted through
centrally-driven and capital-intensive development policies. These policies served the political and economic
interests of the national elite, the regional and local agents they patronised, and the international agencies
and investors who supported them. These changes came as a threat to the traditional adat communities who
had lived o¤ the land and its natural resources for generations and had preserved their autonomous cultures,
including aspects of language, belief, production patterns, law and social institutions till this period.
It is possible that the Soeharto government also pursued a more subtle strategy for promoting national
integration by investing heavily in education. Greater access to education would be welcome in all communi-
ties; but a nationally integrated education system could also be designed to reinforce the Indonesian identity
rather than the varied ethnic and religious identities of its people. In 1974, the Indonesian government initi-
ated a large primary school construction program, the Sekolah Dasar INPRES program. Between 1974 and
1978, 61,807 new buildings were constructed, with special emphasis in regions where initial enrollment rates
were low, doubling the number of available schools per capita. As much as 12% of the regional development
budget was devoted to school construction (as opposed to only 3.4% on regional health); this increased
spending was largely funded by an unprecedented increase in oil revenue during this period.
By the 1990s, cracks were appearing on the façade of the New Order regime as it underwent signicant
transformation itself. This involved a shift from a military regime to a personalistic/autocratic regime as
Soeharto, having outlived all other competitors of his generation, emerged as the unrivalled strongman
(Hill and Shiraisi, 2007). Army o¢ cers who had served as his personal condants dominated the military
(Shiraishi, 1999a). His family members, now grown up and each intent on building his or her own business
empire, relied on presidential powers to obtain business opportunities and privileges.
While adat laws were formally banned during Soehartos regime, the formal ban did not result in their
abandonment everywhere. The geography of the country makes it particularly di¢ cult for the central ad-
ministration to reach the remote islands. Many communities protested against central intervention especially
in the 1990s. Secret wars went on in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya (Schwarz, 1999; McGibbon, 2004).
Jakartas control of powers and resources as well as Javanese domination of the state (i.e. the domination of
mainly Javanese army o¢ cers over the military and civilian state agencies) led to the rising demand for local
autonomy and the appointment of putra daerah (literally, local sons) in strategic positions of provincial
governors, district chiefs, and mayors. Transmigration, forest exploitation, and the consequent disappear-
ance of living space for local Dayaks in Kalimantan led to widespread ethnic violence against Madurese in
East Kalimantan in 1996 (Morishita, 2005). Islamic and Islamist forces found more space for political action
with the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim In-
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donesia) in 1990 (Hefner, 2000; International Crisis Group, 2005). Finally the economic crisis of the 1990s
was a major blow to infrastructural investment; transport and communication output contracted by 36.44%
and 15.13% respectively; road conditions deteriorated signicantly due to the lack of funds for maintenance
and this reduction was more dramatic in rural areas.
The rst free and fair parliamentary elections were held in 1999 and again in 2004. Democratization has
also gone hand in hand with decentralization. The new laws on local autonomy and local nance in 1999
have created local governments that are no longer accountable to the central government but answer to the
local parliament. Article 6 of Act 39 provides an explicit formulation of the recognition and protection of
adat communities and their cultural identity, and considers this recognition and protection as part of the
implementation of human rights.
In summary, a number of factors in Indonesias social, political and economic transformation during, and
immediately following, Soehartos new order regime, are salient for our analysis.
1. The regime had aggressively pursued a policy of centralised scal control up until its end. It also
maintained control over local urban politics, but rural communities were allowed to choose their own
leaders.
2. The central government aimed to undermine traditional adat communities  which had their own
autonomous local institutions for mediating social and economic matters through changes in property
rights for land and natural resources. There is evidence that, at least since the 1990s, this process was
resisted in the more remote provinces.
3. The central government had invested heavily in education, especially in areas with low levels of school
enrollment , starting in the 1970s.
4. The nancial crisis in the late 1990s led to a substantial decline in infrastructural investment, especially
in rural areas.
5. Fiscal decentralisation was accompanied by political decentralisation and democratisation at the local
level.
3 Theoretical Model
3.1 Related Literature
One of the ways in which a group can ensure that its members adhere to a set of prescribed rules in social
and economic interactions is by excluding those who violate them, at least temporarily, from the benets of
group membership. This reasoning plays an important role in theoretical explanations of the functioning of
informal insurance groups (Kimball 1988, Fafchamps 1992, Coate and Ravallion 1994); in which members
of the group comply with the rules of mutual insurance because they value the benets of being part of the
group, and the extent of mutual insurance in turn depends on the extent to which this insurance is valued
by its members.
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Similar mechanisms have been proposed to explain the e¤ectiveness of joint liability credit contracts in
eliciting high repayment rates (Besley and Coate 1995), and contract enforcement in the context of medieval
trade (Greif 1993). According to this kind of reasoning, the extent to which a group can enforce its rules
of behaviour is a¤ected by the benets of group membership, which in turn depends on the outside options
that its members have. Consequently, as the outside options of the members improve, the ability of the
group to enforce its rules declines. Kranton (1996) develops a theoretical model of reciprocal exchange(i.e.
goods or services are given in exchange for future compensation in kind) where this mechanism is in e¤ect:
as markets develop, individuals have more opportunity to engage in trade outside of informal, personalised
exchange; the cost of social exclusion thus declines, which in turn makes it more di¢ cult to sustain honest
behaviour in reciprocal exchange.
Similary, Platteau (2006) has argued that social norms of informal insurance and communal land rights in
traditional village communities become less e¤ective as market integration provides outside opportunities to
a rural population. Ho¤ and Sen (2005) explore the consequences of this type of tension between informal,
personalised exchange and market-based exchange in the context of a kin system. They argue that the
tension provides a kin group the incentives to take collective action to restrict its members from migrating
to the modern sector even if doing so might raise aggregate welfare. Thus, the kin group can lead to a kind
of poverty trap. In the context of informal insurance, Wahhaj (2010) argues that the insuring group will
nd it in its interest to prescribe behaviour that restrict the ability of its members to self-insure (such as
a prescription of excessive consumption) as this increases the value of the service provided by the insuring
group and makes it easier to enforce the rules of mutual insurance using a threat of social exclusion from
the group.
Platteau (2000: Chapter 5) provides a survey of an ethnographic literature on a variety of social norms
and beliefs in traditional societies which make it costly for individuals to engage in behaviour  such as
wealth accumulation which would make them less dependant on solidary networks. Arguably, these norms
and beliefs play the type of function suggested by Ho¤ and Sen (2005) and Wahhaj (2010).
The theoretical contribution of the present paper is to extend the reasoning highlighted above to the
context of local public expenditures. Just as a kin group may wish to engage in collective action which
limits the outside options of its members, a community may choose, collectively, to restrict the type of
public investments that would enable its members to engage better with the outside economy. Moreover,
these incentives should be stronger in communities that have more intra-community exchange to protect.
If such incentives are present, they should have implications for and be apparent in a process of scal
decentralisation. We explore these ideas formally in sections 3.2 to 3.7.
It should be noted that there is an existing theoretical literature on collective action and and the provision
of public services, reviewed, for example, by Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2007). This literature relates
di¤erent characteristics of a group including group size, the distribution of benets and cohesion within
the group to the level of public goods provision, compared to the rst-best level. Our approach is closest to
that of Miguel and Gugerty (2004), who argue that a group with stronger social networks has greater ability
to impose sanctions on group members who free-ride; and therefore should be able to generate a higher
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level of public goods. However, unlike this literature, we distinguish between public goods which support
interactions within communities and across communities, and relate group solidarity to the type of public
good provided.
3.2 Setup
Imagine a community consisting of N members labelled 1; 2; ::; N . In each period, members of the community
face a choice of engaging in trade with a fellow community member or with an outsider. In the present
context, tradeshould be interpreted broadly to include any bilateral exchange which can provide utility to
both sides. Trade with an outsider generates a payo¤ of Vo. Intra-community trade can potentially generate
a payo¤ of Vc for each party. Given the presence of formal institutions which can enforce contracts in the
modern economy, the specied gains from inter-community trade are guaranteed.
Intra-community trade, however, must be supported by the threat of community sanctions, and therefore
we model the strategic interaction between trading parties in more detail. Specically, if two community
members opt to trade with each other, then they must simultaneously choose between the actions Trade
(honestly) and Cheat. The fraction 1   represents the loss in surplus when either or both parties opt to
Cheat. When only one party opts to Cheatand the other party opts to Tradehonestly, there is also a
transfer of resources from the latter to the former equal to a payo¤ of Vc. The payo¤s are summarised in
Table 1 below:
Agent 1nAgent 2 Trade Cheat
Trade Vc; Vc (  )Vc; (+ )Vc
Cheat (+ )Vc; (  )Vc Vc; Vc
where ;  2 (0; 1). If + > 1, then the simultaneous-move game has a unique Nash equilibrium (Cheat,
Cheat) for any Vc > 0. We assume henceforth that this inequality holds.
We distinguish between two kinds of infrastructure which may strengthen the scope of either inter-
community or intra-community trade. Investment in roads and communications technology will facilitate
exchange between the community and the outside world. The development of public spaces within the com-
munity will facilitate social interactions within the community. Schools and health centres will, over time,
improve the level of education and health within the community, and, arguably, provide more scope for
mutually benecial exchange within the community. In summary, physicalinfrastructure (roads, communi-
cations network) is relatively more important for inter-community trade and socialinfrastructure (schools,
health centres, community centres) are relatively more important for intra-community trade.
To capture these ideas within the model, we represent the intra-community and inter-community gains
from trade as follows:
Vc = cWc (Ks) (1)
Vo = oWo (Kp) (2)
where Ks denotes social infrastructure within the community and Kp denotes physical infrastructure. We
assume that the functions Wc (:) and Wo (:) are increasing and strictly concave; furthermore, c and o
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are stochastic variables distributed according to the cummulative distribution functions Fc (:) and Fo (:)
respectively with some positive support

; 

. The gains from trade in each period are stochastic as,
arguably, opportunities for mutually benecial exchange are impossible to foresee completely in advance.
To sustain cooperation in intra-community trade, anyone who cheats must be subject to some kind of
punishment by the community. We assume that this punishment takes the form of exclusion from intra-
community trade for a certain number of periods. During the period of social exclusion, the individual would
still be able to engage in trade with outsiders. Therefore, the severity of the punishment depends on the
value of intra-community trade over inter-community trade, which is itself a function of the punishment
imposed by the community. Therefore, we represent the punishment as a function P (Ks;Kp) which will be
derived endogenously from the model in subsequent sections. We assume that the community also has the
means to impose additional social sanctions proportional to the value of intra-community trade, Wc (Ks)
[the factor  will be used primarily for comparative statics exercises later on]. Then, cooperation can be
sustained in intra-community trade if and only if the following condition holds:
(+   1)Vc   [P (Ks;Kp) + Wc (Ks)] (3)
where  is the discount factor for future utility.
3.3 Choice of Trading Partner
In sections 3.3 to 3.6, we determine the optimal choice of investment in social and physical infrastructure
across di¤erent types of communities. Combining (3) and (1), we obtain
c  
(    1)

P (Ks;Kp)
Wc (Ks)
+ 

(4)
Let us denote by ^c the value of c at each (4) is satised with equality. Then, for c < ^c, cooperation
can be sustained in intra-community trade. Then, a community member will opt for intra-community trade
over inter-community trade if and only if Vc  Vo. For c > ^c, cooperation cannot be sustained in intra-
community trade. Therefore, a community member will opt for intra-community trade over inter-community
trade if and only if Vc  Vo.
Figure 1 shows the possible values that c and o can take in a particular period and the type of trade
 inter-community or intra-community  that will occur for each combination of values. Although the
visual representation is simple and intuitive, the mathematical representation of expected utility for general
distribution functions is unwieldy. Therefore, we make further assumptions about the distributions as follows:
Assumption 1 Fc () =
 
  for  2

; 

; Fc () = 0 for  <  and Fc () = 1 for  >  and
+
2 = 1
Assumption 2 Fo () = 0 for  < 1 and Fo () = 1 for   1.
Assumption 1 says that c is uniformly distributed in the interval

; 

and has an average value of 1.
Assumption 2 says that o always takes a value of 1. These assumptions are made for analytical convenience
and the main insights from the model, as will be seen, do not hinge on them.
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Let  = WoWc . Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there are four possible outcomes, depending on the realised
value of c, as described below:
1. For c 2 (; ), we obtain inter-community trade;
2. For c 2

; ^c

, we obtain intra-community cooperative trade;
3. For c 2

^c;



, we obtain, once again, inter-community trade;
4. For c 2
 

 ; 

, we obtain intra-community non-cooperative trade.
The rst outcome describes the situation where the value of c is su¢ ciently low for cooperation to be
sustained in intra-community trade; but since trade with outsiders is relatively more attractive, community
members opt for the latter. As c increases, community members will begin to nd intra-community trade
more attractive and therefore may switch to this option. This is the second outcome described above.
However, when c crosses the threshold ^c, the temptation to cheat in intra-community trade is too strong:
therefore, cooperation cannot be sustained and members of the community will again prefer trading with
outsiders (third outcome). But for a su¢ ciently high value of c, community members will prefer intra-
community trade to inter-community trade even if cooperation cannot be sustained (fourth outcome).
It should be noted that if  < , then the rst type of outcome cannot occur. Similarly, if  > ^c, or

 < ^c or

 > , then, correspondingly, the second, third or fourth type of outcome is not feasible.
For the subsequent analysis, we assume that  <  < ^c <  < , which means that each of the four
outcomes described above occurs for some range of values of c. Then, for each community member, we can
write the expected utility from trade as follows:
Pr (c < )Wo +
Z ^c

c
   Wcdc + Pr

^c < c < =

Wo +
Z 
=
c
    Wcdc
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= 

   ^c +   
   
!
Wo +
1
2
0B@

^c
2
  2 +   2      2
   
1CAWc (5)
3.4 The Cost of Social Exclusion in Equilibrium
If an individual is prevented from trading with other community members, she would receive a utility of Wo
in each period from trade with outsiders. Therefore, the loss in utility per period from such an embargo is
obtained by subtracting Wo from the expression in (5), as shown below:
B (Kp;Ks) =
1
2
0B@
n 

2     2o+ ^c2   2
   
1CAWc       + ^c   
   
!
Wo (6)
If the punishment imposed on individuals who cheat in intra-community trade is an embargo of T periods,
then we have
P (Kp;Ks) =
XT
t=1
t 1B (Kp;Ks) (7)
Note that it is possible to adjust T , weighing the advantages of increasing severity of punishment against
the social cost of exclusion, so as to maximise the expected utility of community members. However, for the
present analysis, we regard it as an exogenous parameter determined by custom. This may be justied if
long-term social exclusion is not regarded as practical for (economic) reasons not explicitly introduced into
the model.
3.5 How Cooperation is A¤ected by the Relative Gains from Inter-Community
versus Intra-Community Trade
Recall that ^c =

(  1)
h
P (Ks;Kp)
Wc(Ks)
+ 
i
. Using (6) and (7) and the denition of ^c, and letting  (T ) =XT
t=1
t
2( ) ,
(    1) ^c =  (T )
" 

( 

2   

2)
+

^c
2
  2
!
  2

   

+ ^c   
#
+ 
Rearranging and simplifying terms, we obtain
(    1) ^c =  (T )
"


   

2
+

^c   
2#
+  (8)
Equation (8) may have zero, one or two solutions. By construction, ^c 2

; 

. Therefore, we need only
consider solutions in this interval. If there are two solutions in this interval, we consider the one corresponding
to a higher value of ^c as it is pareto-superior to the other.
If
h
    1  2 (T )

^c   
i
< 0 at the (unique or higher-vaIue) solution, this means that values of ^c
above the solution are also sustainable. More precisely, there is an equilibrium where community members
cooperate in intra-community trade for all values of c.
If the equation has no solution in the interval ^c 2

; 

then, if the quadratic expression on the right-
hand side of (8) lies below the linear expression on the left-hand side, then this means that cooperation
11
cannot be sustained in intra-community trade for any value of c; and if the opposite is true, cooperation
can be sustained for all values of c.
The comparative statics are, of course, interesting only if cooperation can be sustained for a subset of c
values. Therefore, the following lemma, on the impact of changing  and  on ^c, focuses on this case. The
proof of the lemma is provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If equation (8) has a solution in the interval

; 

, and
h
    1  2 (T )

^c   
i
> 0 at
this solution, then @^c@ < 0 and
@^c
@ > 0 .
Lemma 1 implies that the level of intra-community cooperation declines in the relative value of inter-
community trade, as represented by .
3.6 How Investment in Infrastructure A¤ects the Utility from Trade
Investment in physical infrastructure leads to an increase in Kp and consequently in the gains from trade
with outsiders, Wo. This leads to a direct increase in the expected utility in trade, as seen in (5), but
also a decrease in the relative value of intra-community trade which, using Lemma 1, makes cooperation in
intra-community trade more di¢ cult to sustain; i.e. it leads to a decrease in ^c. This negatively a¤ects the
expected utility from trade.
Investment in social infrastructure leads to an increase in Ks and consequently in the gains from intra-
community trade, Wc. This leads to a direct increase in the expected utility in trade, as seen in (5), but
also an increase in the relative value of intra-community trade which, using Lemma 1, makes cooperation in
intra-community trade easier to sustain; i.e. it leads to an increase in ^c. This positively a¤ects the expected
utility from trade.
Formally, di¤erentiating throughout (5) with respect to Kp and simplifying terms, we obtain 

   ^c +   
   
!
@Wo
@Kp
+
@
@Kp
@^c
@
 
^cWc  Wo
   
!
(9)
Di¤erentiating throughout (5) with respect to Ks, we obtain
1
2
0B@

^c
2
  2 +  2     2
   
1CA @Wc
@Ks
+
@
@Ks
@^c
@
 
^cWc  Wo
   
!
(10)
The rst term in (9) and (10) represent the direct e¤ects of investment on the expected gains from trade;
while the second term represent the indirect e¤ects. When ^c > , the expression ^cWc Wo is positive and
increasing in the level of cooperation in intra-community trade, and therefore the magnitude of the indirect
e¤ect in both (9) and (10) is higher in communities with higher levels of cooperation.
For xed levels of Ks and Kp, higher  translates into greater cooperation in intra-community trade,
i.e. higher ^c (Lemma 1). From (9) and (10), it is evident that both the direct and indirect e¤ects of an
investment in social infrastructure are increasing in ^c while the direct and indirect e¤ects of an investment
in physical infrastructure are decreasing (in the case of the indirect e¤ect, becoming more negative) in ^c.
Thus, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 1 For a xed level of physical and social infrastructure, if the conditions of Lemma 1 are
satised, communities which exhibit higher levels of intra-community cooperation (greater  and ^c) also
have a stronger preference for investments in social infrastructure compared to physical infrastructure.
3.7 The Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation
Let us denote by U (Kp;Ks; ) the expected utility from trade for an individual in a community where the
level of physical and social infrastructure are given by Kp and Ks respectively and , as discussed in Section
3.3, represents the scope of community sanctions.
It is important to realise that the objective of the relevant authorities  the central government, the
local elite or democratically elected leaders  in allocating public spending, may have included goals not
captured by the term U (Kp;Ks; ). As discussed in Section 2, the Soeharto administration pursued a policy
of national unity and industrialisation and therefore the central government may have preferred investment
choices that would accelerate economic and social integration of isolated communities. The local elite may
have preferred certain types of investment for which the prots were easier to capture.
To capture other objectives that may be pursued by the relevant authorities in determining the allocation
of public spending, we introduce a distinct function  (Kp;Ks) which is continuous and di¤erentiable in
both arguments; and assume that investment decisions were obtained from maximising a weighted average
of U (Kp;Ks; ) and  (Kp;Ks) as below:
max
Kp;Ks
(1  )U (Kp;Ks; ) +  (Kp;Ks) (11)
subject to Kp +Ks  Y and Kp;Ks  0
The e¤ects of scal decentralisation on decisions regarding local public spending can, then, be treated as
a shift in . We denote by Kp (; ; Y ) ;K

s (; ; Y ) the solution to the maximisation problem in (11) and
by 	 the expression

@U
@Ks
  @U@Kp

 

@
@Ks
  @@Kp

. Using Topkistheorem (Topkis 1998), we can establish
the following results (the proof is shown in the Appendix)
Proposition 2 (i) If the conditions of Lemma 1 are satised then @Kp=@ < 0 and K

s =@ > 0; (ii) If
	 > 0 for Kp;Ks > 0, then @Kp=@ > 0 and K

s =@ < 0, and if 	 < 0, then @K

p=@ < 0 and K

s =@ > 0.
The rst part of Proposition 2 implies that, holding xed the role of di¤erent agents  the central
government, the local elite, and the village electorate in the allocation of public funds within the community,
the optimal level of investment (as dened in (11)) in social instructure should be higher and in physical
infrastructure lower in communities characterised by higher levels of cooperation.
The expression 	, in the second part of Proposition 2, measures the change in U (:) when a small quantity
of funds are transferred from physical infrastructural investments to social infrastructural investments, minus
the corresponding changes in  (:). If the expression is positive for all values of Kp and Ks, it means, roughly,
that the relative importance of social infrastructure over physical infrastructure is greater for the benets of
trade compared to whatever policy objective is represented by the function  (:).
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The second part of Proposition 2 states that if this condition holds true, then at a higher value of , the
level of physical infrastructure would be higher, and the level of social infrastructure lower, in the optimal
allocation of public funds.
As we have not specied the function  (:), we cannot say whether and when the conditions in Proposition
2(ii) will hold true. However, using the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that, for xed
values of Ks and Kp, we have Us   Up increasing in .
Therefore, the function 	 (:) is more likely to be positive in communities characterised by higher levels
of cooperation. It follows that in communities with higher levels of cooperation, increasing  would decrease
the allocation of public funds to social infrastructure in the solution to (11); while in communities with lower
levels of cooperation, increasing  would have the opposite e¤ect. We can state this result formally as a
corollory to Propositon 2:
Corollary 1 of Proposition 2: If 0 >  and
@Kp
@ j > 0 and K

s
@ j < 0, then
@Kp
@ j0 > 0 and K

s
@ j0 < 0. If
0 <  and
@Kp
@ j < 0 and K

s
@ j > 0, then
@Kp
@ j0 < 0 and K

s
@ j0 > 0.
We can use the corollary to determine whether scal decentralisation resulted in an increase or decrease
in . Suppose that, in communities characterised by high levels of cooperation, scal decentralisation is
more frequently associated with a shift in local public spending towards social infrastructure and away from
physical infrastructure. If so, then, according to the corollary to Proposition 2, the process of decentralisation
would be consistent with a decrease in ; i.e. with more emphasis being placed on the expected utility from
trade. By contrast, if scal decentralisation is more frequently associated with a shift towards physical
infrastructural spending in communities characterised by high levels of cooperation, then the process would
be consistent with an increase in .
4 Data and Methodology
The analysis is based on community-level data obtained from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).
In addition to household level data akin to that in the Living Standards Measurement Surveys, the IFLS
provides detailed information on communities. Each round of the IFLS contains information on 314 rural
and urban communities drawn from 13 provinces including Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east and south),
Sumatra (north, west and south), Lampung, Wntenara and south Kalimantan (for further details on the
data see Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al. 2009). Although the IFLS was conducted in 1993,
1997, 2000, 2007, only the rounds from 1997 and 2007 contain information on a communitys adherence to
adat laws and nature of governance. Therefore, our analysis makes use of the 1997 and 2007 rounds of the
IFLS only.
4.1 Description of the Data
Formal Institutions: We consider the role of both formal and informal institutions on the provision of
public goods. To analyse the role of formal institutions, we classify communities according to the level
of democratisation in local governance. Local government in Indonesia consists of a headman assisted by
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an appointed village assembly (LMD) throughout the country. Development projects and assistance were
managed by community resilience boards (LKMD) who allocated development grants (mainly from the
central government) across households and projects. Law 22/99, enacted in January 2001, gave villages
more autonomy in raising local revenues, replacing direct grants from the central government. This change
paved the way for scal decentralisation. Elections of both the headman and the council now take place
every ve years and the headman is directly accountable to the council.
The 1997 and 2007 rounds of the IFLS included questions on how the community leader was selected.
Answers to this question are coded as: (i) voting, (ii) all residents, (iii) local elites, (iv) local institutions
and (v) others. Under voting (code (i)) and all residents (code (ii)), the standard notion of plurality
was employed where the voting population consisted of local community residents. Otherwise, community
leaders were chosen by local elites(code (iii)) or by existing o¢ cials of local government bureaucracies (code
(iv)). It is not clear how others(code (v)) selected the local leader, and so we exclude these communities
from our analysis. Accordingly, we classify the local polity as democraticif a leader is selected by free and
fair elections with all community members having the right to vote, and oligarchicif a leader is selected
by community elites (codes (iii) and (iv)), who then remain uncontested. We assume that the incidence of
oligarchies reects the scope for elite capture. Using this data, we dene a binary variable ELITE which
takes a value of 1 for oligarchiccommunities and 0 for democraticcommunities.
Using this classication, Table 1 summarises information on the selection of community leaders across
communities in 1997 and 2007. The data shows substantial changes in the selection process between the two
years. While there is a trend towards increasing democracy which may, in part, be due to the introduction of
the scal decentralisation laws the process of selection of community leaders remained oligarchicin about
one-third of the communities. Although rural communities opted for democracyafter the introduction of
scal decentralisation, there was a greater incidence of oligarchyamong urban communities in our sample.
This pattern may have been a direct result of the Village Law of 1979, discussed in Section 2.
Informal Institutions: To analyse the role of informal institutions on the provision of public goods,
we classify communities according to their degree of adherence to adat laws. The IFLS data place each
community into one of four possible categories: (i) traditional laws are almost never broken; (ii) traditional
laws are sometimes broken; (iii) traditional laws are frequently broken and (iv) only a few people understand
traditional laws. We classify a community as an adat community if adat laws are almost never brokenand
a non-adat community otherwise. Table 2a summarises the distribution of adat communities in 1997 and
2007. Overall, a smaller proportion of sample communities adhered strictly to adat law in 2007 than in 1997.
The IFLS data also provides information on the extent to which community members participate in
mutual cooperation groups. In 1997, a signicantly higher proportion of individuals participated in such
groups in adat communities than in non-adat communities (see Table 2b). But there is a sharp rise in
mutual cooperation activities in both types of communities in 2007, and the di¤erences in the rates of
participation are no longer statistically signicant. As the classication based on adat laws are more stable
across the two years than the classication based on mutual cooperation activities, we regard it as a more
reliable measure of underlying informal institutions at the community-level. The 1997 data indicates that
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the adat communities tend to practise a signicantly higher level of mutual cooperation, and we adopt this
interpretation to interpret our empirical ndings. We dene a binary variable ADAT which takes a value of
1 for communities where adat laws are almost never brokenand 0 otherwise.
Physical Infrastructural Goods: The aim of the paper is to examine how local institutions shape the
provision of di¤erent types of public goods. Therefore, we focus on a number of basic infrastructural goods
that could directly impact on sustainable livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, especially for the
poor. The list of physicalinfrastructural goods we consider includes the communitys access to cemented
local roads , access to motorised public transport including buses and boats, access to a public telephone
o¢ ce, and access to a post o¢ ce. Local roads and motorised public transport can subtantially reduce the
disadvantages associated with geographical isolation and remoteness and are, therefore, potentially important
tools for economic development and poverty alleviation. Similarly, the availability of public telephone services
and post o¢ ces could substantially reduce the disadvantages associated with location and distance. Using
principal components methods, we generate a composite infrastructural goods index consisting of the afore-
mentioned physical infrastructural goods (labelled PCINFRA).
Social Goods: We compare these physical infrastructural goods with a communitys access to two
important socialgoods: namely, the number of government schools and health centres per capita. Table 3
compares adat and non-adat communities in terms of their access to these public goods. It is evident that
the adat communities have worse access to physicalinfrastructural goods but better access to government
schools and health centres.
In general, the scal decentralisation in Indonesia did not, in fact, decentralise the system of revenues.
Rather, the key change was a shift in the centre of power from the central government in Jakarta to the
district governments located in the district headquarters. Fiscal decentralisation, as contained in Law 25/99,
gave communities absolute freedom on how to spend public funds received from the district headquarters,
which they did not have before.The district governments received grants from the central government for a
General Allocation Fundaccording to the following scal needs formula(Brodjonegoro 2001):
average local expenditure  14 [population index + area index + construction price index + poverty index]
The IFLS data provides details of the community budget and we use this information to calculate the
allocation of public spending between new social and physical infrastructural goods. Accordingly, we classify
community level spending as follows: (i) spending on social development, which includes spending on edu-
cation, health, community services and womens development and (ii) spending on village enterprises and
physical infrastructural goods. The remainder of community public budget goes to the maintenance of local
infrastructure, the payment of salaries and other administrative expenses. We construct variables SHSOC
and SHINFRA dened, respectively, as the proportion of total development spending on social infrastructure,
and the proportion of total development spending on physical infrastructure.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the source of revenues and share of spending on di¤erent types
of public goods in 1997 and 2007. It is evident that the share of the funds received directly from the central
government fell sharply following decentralisation; however, this decline was accompanied by an increase in
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the share of the funds received from the district-level governments. Furthermore, there was a signicant
increase in the share of community spending on physicalinfrastructural goods in the post-decentralisation
period when local governments were given full freedom to spend according to their needs.
4.2 Methodology
We exploit changes in the share of the grant from the central government in the community budget before
and after the introduction of scal decentralisation to identify the causal e¤ects of scal autonomy, and
informal and formal institutions, on the provision of public goods. Our identication strategy is described
below.
Let yit be the share of the public good y in the total expenditures budget of community i in period t;
and let Xit be a vector of characteristics of community i in period t. Let Rit be a measure of the extent to
which spending is determined by local authorities versus central government authorities in community i in
period t (with larger numbers indicating a greater say for local authorities) .
We propose the following relationship:
yit = Xitx + (Rit Xit)rx + uit (12)
where E(uitjXit; Rit) = 0, V ar(uitjXit; Rit) = 2. In general, scal decentralisation shifted Rit in
favour of local authorities. However, the extent of the shift may be correlated to the initial conditions in
the community. Morever, certain community characteristics, particularly local institutions, may themselves
have been a¤ected by the process of scal decentralisation (besides other exogenous factors). Therefore, we
proceed by estimating the following equation with Rit as the dependent variable:
Rit = Ziz + (Dt  Zi)tz + vit (13)
where Dt is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 in year 2007 and 0 otherwise; and Zi is a set of
time-invariant community-level characteristics. Equation (13) allows for the e¤ect of these time-invariant
community characteristics on Rit to change over time. This assumption seems plausible as the scal de-
centralisation laws, introduced in 2001, changed the balance between the local government and the central
government in local public spending decisions. Using our estimates for (13), we can compute, R^it, predicted
values for Rit. We can replace Rit with its predicted values in (12) and estimate the resulting equation with
community xed-e¤ects.
Variables in Zi can, of course, directly inuence yit. But there is no a priori reason to assume that the
direct inuence of Zi on yit changes from one period to the next. Equation (12) implicitly assumes that
the direct inuence of any time-invariant community characteristics on yit is constant over time. Under
this assumption, the direct inuence of Zi on Rit will be absorbed in community xed-e¤ects and any
time-variation in R^it can be attributed to the scal decentralisation process. Therefore, it constitutes our
identifying assumption for determining the e¤ect of Rit on yit.
In practice, we measure Rit using the share of the grant from the central government in the communitys
public spending budget. We take a larger share to indicate that the central government had greater inuence
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in local spending decisions. We select variables for Zi using the scal rule formuladiscussed in the preceding
section as a guide: Z includes the population and geographic size of the community, its distance from the
district headquarters, the proportion of households in the community that are poor, and binary variables to
indicate whether the community is rural and has access to sea, and whether Islam is the main religion. (The
population and the poverty rate, of course, do change over time but these changes account for only a small
part of the total variation in R^it). We use district xed-e¤ects to estimate (13), as the scal rule formula
was applied at the level of the district.
We estimate equation (12) with SHSOC (the share of socialspending in the communitys public goods
expenditures) and SHINFRA (the share of physical infrastructural spending in the communitys public
goods expenditures) as the dependent variable. Furthermore, to see how the stock of physical infrastructure
and social goods are inuenced by decentralisation and local institutions, we also use the index of physical
infrastructural goods (PCINFRA) and the number of government schools and health centres per capita as the
dependent variable. We include the binary variables ELITE and ADAT among community characteristics in
the second-stage equation as we are interested in the impact of local institutions on local public spending and
the di¤erential impact of scal decentralisation across di¤erent types of local institutions. Our second-stage
specication can be written as follows:
yit = AdatitA + EliteitE + R^itCG + (R^it Adatit)CGA + (R^it  Eliteit)CGE + ci + uit (14)
We also compare the IV estimates of (14) with the un-instrumented estimates (15) below
yit = Adatita + Eliteite +Ritcg + (Rit Adatit)cga + (Rit  Eliteit)cge + ci + vit (15)
We estimate equations (14) and (15) with community xed-e¤ects ci to absorb the direct e¤ect of time-
invariant community characteristics.
According to the theoretical results discussed in Section 3.7, the sign of the coe¢ cient CGA should
indicate whether scal decentralisation led to a change in the weight assigned to expected gains from within-
and between-community trade for community members in determining the allocation of local public expen-
ditures. If the coe¢ cient is negative when y is the share of social investments in the community budget, this
means that an increase in R^it corresponds to a decrease in  as dened in Section 3.7. In other words, scal
decentralisation led to increased emphasis on gains from trade for community members in public spending
decisions. If the coe¢ cient is positive, then scal decentralisation shifted emphasis from the gains from trade
for community members to other social, economic or political objectives.
5 Empirical Results and Analysis
In this section, we present and analyse our results. We start with the un-instrumented estimates of equation
(15) as shown in Appendix Table A1. However, given the potential endogeneity of the share of the central
grant as a measure of R, we focus our analysis on the instrumented estimates of equation (14). These
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estimates are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7: while Table 5 shows the rst stage estimates of share of central
grant, Tables 6 and 7 respectively show the instrumented estimates of the share of public spending on
physical infrastructure and social goods (see section 5.1) and access to public infrastructural goods (see
section 5.2). For each dependent variable, we also conduct the Davidson-McKinnon exogeneity test to
examine the consistency of the OLS with the corresponding IV estimates in a panel framework. This
computes an F-statistic where the null hypothesis is that an uninstrumented OLS of the same equation
would yield consistent estimates. A rejection of the null hypothesis would in turn mean that the endogenous
regressors e¤ects on the particular dependent variable are meaningful. Finally, we check the robustness
of our central estimates shown in Tables 6 and 7, by considering sub-samples of communities that did not
experience any change in formal and informal institutions over the decade 1997-2007 (see section 5.4).1
In order to obtain the instrumented estimates of public goods provision, we start with the district-level
FE-OLS estimates of equation (13). We include not only the set of variables Z (see section 4.2), but also
a set of interaction terms between a year-dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 for the year 2007 and
0 otherwise) and variables in Z. As indicated above, the choice of explanatory variables has been dictated
by the scal rule formula introduced at the time of scal decentralisation in 2001. These estimates are
clustered at the district-level to minimise the problem of correlation over time for a given district (see Table
5). We particularly focus our attention on the interaction terms which represent the di¤erential e¤ects
of scal decentralisation. In general, there is evidence of a signicant di¤erential e¤ect of the population,
geographical size, and location of the community (i.e. whether or not it is rural and has access to sea and its
distance from the district headquarters). The estimates indicate that, while the share of the grant from the
central government in the community public spending budget fell across communities on average in 2007,
the decline was more muted in coastal, rural, more populous, and geographically larger communities. We
use these estimates to calculate tted values for the share of the central government grant. These values are
then used as the relevant community-level instrument for the estimation of public goods provision, as laid
out in equation (12).
5.1 Estimates of Shares of Public Spending
Table 6 reports the estimated coe¢ cients from the second-stage regressions involving the share of physical
and social investments in the community budget. In each case, the Davidson-McKinnon test rejects the
null hypothesis suggesting that the panel IV estimates are meaningful. In the case of physical investments
(column 1), the coe¢ cient of the share of the central government grant in the community budget is negative
and signicant. Thus, as the central governments share in the community budget increases, spending on
physical infrastructure goes down. Given the signs of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms, this negative
e¤ect is even stronger for adat communities but more muted for elitecommunities (both are statistically
signicant). For the share of social spending (column 2), the central governments share in the community
budget does not signicantly a¤ect spending on social goods. However, there is potentially a positive e¤ect
on adat communities (though statistically insignicant) and a negative e¤ect on elitecommunities.
1The corresponding rst stage estimates are shown in Appendix Table A4.
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These results indicate that the process of decentralisation which led to a decline in central govern-
ments contributions to local budgets led to a sharp rise in the share of community spending on physical
infrastructural investments. Furthermore, this e¤ect was stronger for adat communities and weaker for elite
communities. This implies that the central government constrained infrastructural spending across all com-
munities; but to a greater extent in adat communities than in non-adat communities; and to a lesser extent
in elitecommunities than in non-elitecommunities.
By contrast, scal decentralisation did not lead to a signicant change in the share of community budgets
devoted to social spending.
5.2 Estimates of Public Infrastructural Goods
Table 7 reports the estimates from the second-stage regressions involving the existing level of public goods
provision. As with public spending shares, in these cases too, the Davidson-McKinnon test rejects the null
hypothesis suggesting that the panel IV estimates are meaningful.
Recall that the dependent variable PCINFRA (column 1) is a composite index comprising of binary
variables indicating the presence of concrete roads, access to bus services, post o¢ ce facilities, and a public
telephone o¢ ce in the community. As such, it is a measure of physical infrastructure which facilitate
communication and exchange with individuals outside of the community; and it can be regarded as the
stock variable corresponding to the measure of investment in physical infrastructure considered in the
previous section.
The coe¢ cient for the variable ELITE is negative and statistically signicant while that of ADAT is
close to zero; therefore, the level of physical infrastructure is lower in communities where the process of
selecting leaders is non-democratic; but there is little di¤erence between adat and non-adat communities.
The coe¢ cient of the share of the central governments grant in the community budget is negative and
statistically signicant; therefore, an increased role of the central government in budget decisions is associated
with lower levels of physical infrastructure.
However, the corresponding interaction term with the variable ELITE is positive, statistically signicant,
and of the same order of magnitude as the uninteracted term. Thus, where local institutions favour the
elite, changing the share of the central government in the budget has no impact on the stock of physical
infrastructure; the objectives of the central government are in line with those of the elite. The coe¢ cient for
the interaction term with the variable ADAT is not signicantly di¤erent from zero; this suggest that the
central government did not pursue di¤erential policies in adat versus non-adat communities.
We also consider how the share of the central governments grant in the local budget inuences the number
of government schools and health centres per capita (columns 2 and 3 of Table 7). These can be regarded
as the stockvariable corresponding to the measure of investment in social infrastructure considered in the
previous section. The central government appears to have a strongly positive e¤ect on the stock of schools
but a negative e¤ect on health centres.
In adat communities, a greater role of the central government is associated with more schools and more
health centres (both e¤ects are statistically signicant). But in the elite communities, a greater role of
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the central government is associated with fewer schools and health centres (albeit the second e¤ect is not
statistically signicant).
By contrast, we do not observe any signicant di¤erences between adat and non-adat communities and
eliteand non-elitecommunities in terms of the stock of social infrastructure, when the central government
is absent.
In summary, the estimates with the stock variables are very similar to those with the investment share
variables. The di¤erence between communities with di¤erent local institutions is not that they exhibit
di¤erent preferences in public goods spending with the exception that elitecommunities appear to care
less about investment in physical infrastructure and have lower levels of infrastructure but rather that the
central government, when and where it had a role in these decisions, pursued di¤erent policies in communities
with varying local institutions. The central government is investing less in the physical infrastructure of adat
communities, and there are indications that they are investing more in the social infrastructure of these
communities. Moreover, the central goverment is o¤seting the tendency of elitecommunities to spend less
on physical infrastructure, and supressing spending on social infrastructure in these communities. In the
next section, we consider possible explanations for these results.
5.3 Possible Explanations
5.3.1 East Asian Financial Crisis
The rst explanation we need to consider is that public spending between the two rounds of the survey, 1997
and 2007, was a¤ected by the East Asian nancial crisis. The crisis inicted a major blow to infrastructural
investment; transport and communication output contracted by 36.44% and 15.13% respectively; road con-
ditions deteriorated signicantly due to the lack of maintenance funds and this reduction was more dramatic
in rural areas (World Bank 2004b).
The crisis would have suppressed spending on both physical infrastructure and social infrastrcuture at
the start of the crisis in 1997. And the recovery in spending would have occurred during the same period that
scal spending was being decentralised. Therefore, we would expect the data to show a negative correlation
between the share of central government funds in the community budget and spending on infrastructure.
Indeed, in the estimation results we observe a negative e¤ect of centralisation on spending in physical
infrastructure. However two other factors in the results indicate that this cannot be explained entirely by the
East Asian nancial crisis. The rst is that we observe similar e¤ects not only for annual spending but also
for the corresponding stock variables across communities. While spending in 1997 would have been adversely
a¤ected by the nancial crisis which began in the same year it seems implausible that the stock of physical
infrastructure in those communities would have su¤ered and declined to the same extent at the very start
of the crisis. Second, while we observe a negative e¤ect of scal centralisation on physical infrastructure
spending, we do not observe a similar e¤ect for spending on schools and health centres. This suggests that
the positive e¤ect of scal decentralisation on physical infrastructure spending in communities we observe in
the data goes beyond the simple correlation between the process of decentralisation and recovery from the
East Asian nancial crisis.
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5.3.2 Urban Bias
The second possibility that needs to be considered is urban bias in development policies pursued by the Soe-
harto regime in Indonesia (1966-1998)..The 1979 village laws laid down by Soeharto made a.clear distinction
between rural and urban areas with, for example, di¤erential rules for the selection of leaders in rural and
urban communities. Soeharto supported national entrepreneurship to build big businesses, which in turn led
to the rapid development of urban centres (Hill and Shiraishi 2007). It can also be argued that Soehartos
power base was concentrated in urban areas and, therefore, the central government had clear incentives to
invest more heavily in these areas.
It is evident from Table 1 and Table 2 that the elitecommunities identied in our data are more likely
to be urban; while the adat communities are more likely to be rural. Urban bias would translate into higher
spending in elite communities and lower spending in the adat communities; and if the process of scal
decentralisation reduced urban bias, decentralisation would be associated with increased spending in adat
communities and decreased spending in elitecommunities.
We noted earlier that the central government constrained infrastructural spending to a greater extent
in adat communities than in non-adat communities; and to a lesser extent in elitecommunities than in
non-elitecommunities. This would be consistent with a policy of urban bias in the development of physical
infrastructure. However, in the case of social infrastructure (schools and hospitals), the regressions involving
stock levels indicate that the central government invested more heavily in adat communities and less in the
elitecommunities; a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the notion of urban bias alone.
5.3.3 Decentralisation and Community Norms
One of the aims of this paper is to study how scal decentralisation a¤ected communities which practised
traditional norms of solidarity, compared to those where such norms are weak or absent. For this purpose
we distinguished, as described earlier, between adat and non-adat communities in the data; and analysed,
within a theoretical model, the socially optimal investment choice as a function of the existing level of mutual
cooperation in the community.
The estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction term involving the binary variable ADAT and the share of the
central governments grant in the community budget, in Table 7, indicate that the central government made
di¤erential choices across adat and non-adat communities. Specically, the coe¢ cients imply that, in adat
communities, scal centralisation was associated with greater investment in social infrastructure (i.e. schools
and health centres) and less investment in physical infrastructure, compared to non-adat communities. (The
estimated coe¢ cients for the interaction term adat x shcg_iv_distfefor the investment shares regressions
in Table 6, although statistically insignicant, are consistent with this interpretation). According to the
theoretical discussion in Section 3.7, these estimates imply that scal decentralisation led to an increase in
; i.e. greater weight being placed on factors other than the e¤ects of investments on intra-community trade,
as represented by the function U (Kp;Ks; ).
The small and statistically insignicant coe¢ cients for the ADAT variable in the corresponding regressions
imply that, by 2007 when the contribution of the central government in the community budget had, on
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average, declined to 6% there was little di¤erence in the investment choices and levels of infrastructure
across adat and non-adat communities; thus, scal decentralisation eroded the initial di¤erences in public
spending.
The di¤erential levels of investment across adat and non-adat communities in the pre-decentralisation
period appears, at rst glance, contrary to the Soeharto regimes policy of national integration (Hill and
Shiraishi 2007). However, the literature also documents organised resistence to the central governments
e¤orts to control resources and political power in remote communities (Warren 2005a). Direct investment in
physical infrastructure of these communities, to improve communication with the outside world, may have
been viewed as encroachment and interference with their traditional way of life. Indeed, on a number of
islands, such e¤orts triggered immediate protests (Warren 2005b).
It is possible that the government pursued a more subtle strategy for promoting national integration
by investing heavily in education. Greater access to education would be welcome in all communities but
it could also be designed to reinforce the Indonesian identity rather than the varied ethnic and religious
identities of school students. Duo (2001) highlights the importance of the very large school construction
projects initiated in 1973 with a view to boost school enrolment and thus redress regional inequality across
the country. This was particularly evident in the second ve-year plan that saw as much as 12% of the
regional development budget being spent on school construction (as opposed to only 3.4% of the regional
development budget on public health). Indeed, in Table 7, we see that centralised scal control is associated
with more schools per capita at the expense of medical centres.
We argue that the investment choices during the period of centralised scal control were closer to the
optimallevels (dened in terms of an objective of maximising the gains of trade, as represented by the func-
tion U (Kp;Ks; ) in Section 3.7) in adat communities because deviations would have been met with strong
resistance from the communities themselves. The non-adat communities, would have less reason to worry
about investments in communications and transport (as the extent of mutual cooperation is lower to start
with) and therefore, the central government would have been more successful in making such investments.
In the post-decentralisation period, community members have more say about how public funds are in-
vested within the community. But it is important to note that while any opposition to the central government
during the period of centralised scal control would have been a collective community e¤ort, in a democratic
setting community members vote individually and secretly. Individual community members may not take
into account the possibility that certain investment choices will unravel cooperation in the future; or they
may ignore the consequences of these investments because the process is too gradual to a¤ect their personal
welfare. Thus, investment in communications and transport infrastructure may receive greater support in the
post-decentralisation period, both in adat and non-adat communities. This may explain why, as previously
noted, the e¤ect of decentralisation on public spending appears to be consistent with an increase in , as
dened in (11).
Indeed, consistent with this narrative, we observe (i) higher levels of physical infrastructure investment in
the post-decentralisation period; (ii) lack of variation in physical infrastructure investment across adat and
non-adat communities in the post-decentralisation period; (iii) greater investment in physical infrastructure,
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as well as higher levels of physical infrastructure in non-elitecommunities in which community members
vote individually for leaders and policies than in elitecommunities in the post-decentralisation period.
5.4 Robustness Checks
It is possible to argue that scal decentralisation induced changes in both formal and informal institutions in
our sample and, as such, these variables are potentially endogenous. To address this issue, we examine the
robustness of our results by considering communities with stable institutions: (i) communities where there
was no change in local polity (i.e. those with stable polity) and (ii) communities which saw no change in
terms of their adherence to adat laws over the decade (i.e., those with stable adat). These two sets of results
are shown in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 respectively.
The results are essentially similar to what we found earlier. As before, when the share of investments
in physical infrastructure is the dependent variable, the coe¢ cient of the central government grant share is
negative and signicant. Therefore, as the central governments share in the community budget increases,
spending on physical infrastructure goes down. Given the signs of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms,
this negative e¤ect is stronger for adat communities but more muted for elite communities (both are
statistically signicant). This result holds for both types of communities those with stable polity and those
with stable adherence to adat over the decade.
The e¤ect is slightly di¤erent for these two types of communities when we consider the share of social
infrastructural spending: the coe¢ cient of the central governments share in the community budget is positive
and statistically signicant (at the 10% level) for communities with stable adat and the e¤ect is statistically
insignicant for communities with stable polity. The interaction terms are insignicant in all cases except
one: there is an additional negative e¤ect of an increase in the share of central grant on elitecommunities,
signicant at the 10% level. Broadly, these estimates are in line with those obtained for the full sample, as
shown in Table 6.
6 Concluding Comments
Improving the quality of public services available to the poor is, potentially, an important tool for poverty
alleviation in developing countries; and the potential role of scal decentralisation in this process has been
discussed extensively in the literature (World Bank 2004a). Since decentralisation provides greater decision-
making power to local governments, its impact on public goods provision should, arguably, depend on the
quality and nature of local institutions.
With this motivation, this paper investigated the impact of scal decentralisation on local public spending
in Indonesia using two rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey. Specically, we explored how the share
of public spending on goods which facilitate communication and exchange with outsiders (collectively called
physical infrastructure) and health and education (collectively called social infrastructure) vary across
communities which di¤er in terms of their adherence to customary law and practice of local democracy.
We found that the period of centralised scal control was characterised by signicant heterogeneity across
communities and that this heterogeneity disappeared following decentralisation.
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Broadly, these ndings indicate that the central government pursued di¤erent policies on public spending
across communities depending on the nature of local institutions. But when decision-making power regarding
public spending was transferred to the communities, they opted for similar policies, at least as measured by
the share of spending on physical infrastructureand social infrastructure.
Decisions regarding local public spending, when in the hands of the central government, can, potentially,
be shaped by political factors and strategies at the national level and the political science literature indicates
that this was true in the case of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia, as discussed in Section 2. Our ndings
on heterogeneity of spending across communities prior to decentralisation provide support to this view.
However, the question as to whether or not the allocation of public spending following decentralisation
was more e¢ cient requires a more nuanced answer. We suggest the possibility that, during the period of
centralised scal control, community leaders were able to bargain more e¤ectively with the central government
and push for policies that would maximise community welfare, and that this became more di¢ cult following
decentralisation when community members were, at least in some instances, able to vote, secretly and
individually, for policies of their choice while ignoring negative externalities on other community members.
Such a narrative may explain why traditional adat communities spent a smaller share of development
funds on physical infrastructure compared to non-adat communities in line with the social optimum derived
in our theoretical model during the period of centralised scal control but not after scal decentralisation
had been implemented.
7 Appendix
Proof. of Lemma 1: Di¤erentiating throughout (8) with respect to , we obtain
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By assumption,     1  2 (T )

^c   

> 0. Therefore, using (16), we have @^c@ < 0.
Di¤erentiating throughout (8) with respect to , we obtain
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Once again, if     1  2 (T )

^c   

> 0, then @^c@ > 0.
Proof. of Proposition 2: Let U^ (K; ) = U (Y  K;K; ) and ^ (K) = x (Y  K;K). Then the maximisa-
tion problem in (11) is equivalent to
max
0KY
(1  ) U^ (K; ) + ^ (K) (17)
Let us denote by K () the solution to (17). Then, Ks (Y; )  K () and Kp (Y; )  Y  K ().
(i) By denition, @U^@K =
@U
@Ks
  @U@Kp . Therefore, using Proposition 1, @
2U^
@K@ > 0. By construction,
@2^
@K@ = 0.
Therefore, we can apply Topkis theorem to (17) to show that @K

@ > 0. Therefore, @K

p=@ < 0 and
Ks =@ > 0.
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(ii) By construction, taking the derivative w.r.t. K and  throughout the maximand in (17), we obtain
 

@U^
@K   @^@K

. If 	 < 0 for all Ks;Kp  0, then we can apply Topkistheorem to obtain Ks =@ > 0 and
@Kp=@ < 0. Similarly, if 	 > 0 for all Ks;Kp  0, then we can apply Topkistheorem to obtain Ks =@ < 0
and @Kp=@ > 0.
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Table 1. Method of Selection of Community Leaders 1997-2007 
 1997 2007 
 Rural urban rural urban 
Consensus 38 53 15 18 
Voting 64 50 100 78 
Oligarchy 18 89 5 96 
Total 120 192 120 192 
 
2 
 
Table 2A. Adherence to Adat laws across Communities 1997-2007 
 1997 (% of total communities) 2007 (% of total communities) 
 Rural Urban  Rural Urban  
Adat laws are never broken 38.41 24.81 28.69 21.63 
Adat laws are sometimes broken 40.58 51.13 35.25 23.56 
Adat laws are frequently broken 1.45 3.76 9.84 20.67 
Only a few understand Adat laws  19.57 19.55 26.23 34.13 
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Table 2B. Practice of Mutual Cooperation across Adat and Non-adat 
Communities 1997-2007 
 1997 
% of communities with mutual 
cooperation groups 
2007 
% of communities with mutual 
cooperation groups 
 ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat 
Rural 94.23 76.47 2.5350** 100 100 - 
Urban 93.93 88.66 0.8691 100 0.9421 1.6339 
 1997 
% of communities with coop groups 
for community infrastructure 
2007 
% of communities with coop groups 
for community infrastructure 
 ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat ADAT=1 ADAT=0 T-stat 
Rural 41.51 27.06 1.7684* 95.40 91.43 0.8492 
Urban 18.18 13.53 0.6764 95.56 89.02 1.3235 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Mutual cooperation groups may exist for the purpose of worship, weddings, funerals, 
maintaining community cleanliness or development of infrastructure.   
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Table 3. Inter-community Variation in Public Goods Provision 
Variables 
adat 
communities 
non-adat 
communities 
t-stat 
Access to bus services 0.23 0.32 -2.2520** 
Access to paved roads 0.84 0.92 -2.5689*** 
Public telephone office 0.50 0.67 -3.9604*** 
Access to a post office 0.16 0.29 -3.4384*** 
Government schools   
    per 100 people 
1.85 1.41 1.9428** 
Government health facilities 
    per 100 people 
1.66 1.46 1.44 
Share of public spending on  
    physical infrastructure 
0.24 0.28 -1.0097 
Share of public spending on  
    social infrastructure 
0.12 0.11 1.5061 
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Table 4. Changes in Community Revenues and Public Spending 1997-2007 
Variables 1997 2007 
 Mean (sd) Mean (sd) 
Share of spending on  
    Social Infrastructure 0.1078 (0.1153) 0.1284 (0.1955) 
    Physical infrastructure 0.0658 (0.0839) 0.4992 (0.3691) 
 
Share of revenues from 
    Central Government 
    District Headquarters 
 
 
0.3291 (0.3119) 
0.0911 (0.1877) 
 
 
0.0663 (0.1745) 
0.4066 (0.3479) 
    Local Funds 0.3786 (0.3781) 0.3925 (0.3256) 
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Table 5. Fist-Stage District Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Share of the Central 
Government’s Grant in the Community Budget 
    
VARIABLES (1) VARIABLES (2) 
    
  Year 2007 interacted with 
Log(population) -0.119***     Log(population) 0.0870*** 
 (0.0274)  (0.0319) 
Log(area) -0.0193     Log(area) 0.0248* 
 (0.0136)  (0.0140) 
Rural -0.108**     Rural 0.172*** 
 (0.0523)  (0.0607) 
Poverty Rate -0.0126     Poverty Rate Dropped 
 (0.0395)   
Access to Sea  -0.129***     Access to Sea 0.120** 
 (0.0460)  (0.0552) 
Distance from  
    District HQ 
 
-0.00173 
    Distance from 
        District HQ 
0.00335** 
(0.00162) 
 (0.00141)   
Year 2007 -1.345***   
 (0.248)   
Constant 1.679***   
 (0.204)   
District FE Yes   
Observations 515   
R-squared 0.378   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Allocation of public spending, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SHINFRA SHSOC 
   
Share of Central Gov’t Grant -1.788*** 0.0695 
 (0.189) (0.0986) 
ADAT x Central Gov’t Share -0.253 0.251 
 (0.251) (0.205) 
ELITE x Central Gov’t Share 1.040*** -0.269* 
 (0.247) (0.160) 
ADAT -0.0211 0.0169 
 (0.0663) (0.0428) 
ELITE -0.267*** 0.0226 
 (0.0726) (0.0436) 
Constant 0.643*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0189) 
Community FE Yes Yes 
Observations 505 504 
R-squared 0.556 0.063 
Davidson-McKinnon F-statistic 20.4313*** 2.847483** 
Number of communities 254 253 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Access to public goods, IV Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PCINFRA Gov’t Schools 
per 100 
Gov’t Health 
Centres per 100 
    
Share of Central Gov’t Grant -1.827*** 1.299** -1.630*** 
 (0.298) (0.553) (0.508) 
ADAT x Central Gov’t Share -0.172 0.837*** 0.796* 
 (0.479) (0.247) (0.405) 
ELITE x Central Gov’t Share 1.798*** -1.400** -0.450 
 (0.402) (0.670) (0.662) 
ADAT 0.000132 -0.0748 -0.159 
 (0.133) (0.155) (0.163) 
ELITE -0.508*** 0.250 -0.0934 
 (0.107) (0.167) (0.261) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 616 616 610 
R-squared 0.185 0.048 0.090 
Davidson-McKinnon F-stat 23.2028*** 3.265839*** 31.20235*** 
Number of communities 311 311 311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Uninstrumented estimates of public goods provision all communities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES SHINFRA SHSOC PCINFRA Schools per 100 Health Centres per 100 
      
ADAT -0.0177 0.0264 -0.0374 0.0781 0.0923 
 (0.0731) (0.0323) (0.142) (0.127) (0.157) 
ELITE  -0.308*** 0.00498 -0.267** 0.349** -0.0497 
 (0.0983) (0.0420) (0.120) (0.161) (0.194) 
Share of Central Gov’t Grant -1.506*** 0.141** -0.515** 0.679 -0.718* 
 (0.165) (0.0546) (0.241) (0.498) (0.380) 
ADAT x Central Gov’t Share 0.192 -0.276** -0.306 -0.281 -0.142 
 (0.420) (0.130) (0.378) (0.598) (0.536) 
ELITE x Central Gov’t Share 1.325*** -0.151 0.473 -0.526 0.0707 
 (0.228) (0.0951) (0.337) (0.561) (0.459) 
Constant 0.561*** 0.109*** 0.200*** 1.266*** 1.658*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0136) (0.0615) (0.0974) (0.0831) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 500 498 610 610 608 
R-squared 0.399 0.29 0.050 0.035 0.066 
Number of communities 250 249 305 305 304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. FE-IV estimates of public goods provision in communities with 
stable local polity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES SHINFRA SHSOC PCINFRA1 Schools per 100 Health Centres per 100 
      
Share of Central Gov’t Grant -1.549*** -0.0593 -1.384*** 1.314*** -1.226*** 
 (0.178) (0.0853) (0.290) (0.481) (0.395) 
ADAT x Central Gov’t Share 0.187 -0.193 -0.739 0.00408 -0.236 
 (0.298) (0.227) (0.565) (1.136) (1.073) 
ELITE x Central Gov’t Share 1.143*** -0.239* 1.188*** -1.167* -0.986 
 (0.288) (0.141) (0.445) (0.620) (0.746) 
ADAT -0.000990 0.0283 0.0156 0.0196 -0.0906 
 (0.0718) (0.0455) (0.148) (0.159) (0.177) 
ELITE Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
      
Constant 0.537*** 0.138*** 0.161*** 1.323*** 1.813*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0171) (0.0567) (0.0805) (0.0663) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 299 299 442 442 437 
R-squared 0.508 0.046 0.172 0.072 0.127 
Number of communities 187 187 222 222 222 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that the ELITE variable is dropped in the panel FE model, as there is no change in local 
polity in this case.  
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Table A3. FE-IV estimates of public goods provision for communities with no 
change in adherence in adat laws. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES SHINFRA SHSOC PCINFRA Schools per 100 Health Centres per 100 
      
Share of Central Gov’t Grant -1.573*** 0.0191* -1.675*** 1.210* -1.366** 
 (0.275) (0.0104) (0.357) (0.708) (0.597) 
ADAT x Central Gov’t Share 0.743* 0.530 0.535 0.373 -0.431 
 (0.401) (0.395) (0.689) (0.886) (0.828) 
ELITE x Central Gov’t Share 1.077*** -0.189 1.470*** -1.306* -0.755 
 (0.336) (0.161) (0.447) (0.731) (0.821) 
ADAT Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
      
ELITE -0.283*** 0.00259 -0.398*** 0.177 -0.142 
 (0.0876) (0.0536) (0.124) (0.213) (0.305) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.147*** 0.509*** 1.098*** 1.805*** 
 (0.0552) (0.0247) (0.0772) (0.143) (0.138) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 249 384 384 379 
R-squared 0.494 0.092 0.150 0.036 0.101 
Number of communities 160 159 194 194 194 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Note that the ADAT variable is dropped in the panel FE model, as there is no change in 
adherence to adat in this case.  
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Table A4. First stage District Fixed-Effects estimates of  
the Share of the Central Government’s Grant in Communities with Stable Polity 
and no change in adherence to adat Laws 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES stable polity stable adat 
   
Ln(Population) -0.147*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0318) 
Ln(Size) 0.00427 -0.0451*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0156) 
Rural -0.144* -0.104* 
 (0.0796) (0.0592) 
Islam -0.00876 0.0332 
 (0.0767) (0.0833) 
Poverty Rate -0.0236 0.0143 
 (0.0518) (0.0509) 
Access to Sea -0.0682 -0.118* 
 (0.0447) (0.0695) 
Distance to District HQ -0.00174 0.000469 
 (0.00117) (0.00315) 
Year 2007 -1.398*** -1.543*** 
 (0.315) (0.315) 
   
Year 2007 interacted with   
    Ln(Population) 0.104*** 0.0764** 
 (0.0373) (0.0365) 
    Ln(Size) 0.00495 0.0622*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0214) 
    Rural 0.223** 0.144** 
 (0.103) (0.0692) 
    Distance to District HQ 0.00299** 0.00189 
 (0.00141) (0.00491) 
    Sea 0.0820 0.107 
 (0.0575) (0.0673) 
    Islam 0.0517 0.112 
 (0.0878) (0.0743) 
   
Constant 1.803*** 1.729*** 
 (0.272) (0.298) 
District FE Yes Yes 
Observations 376 370 
R-squared 0.387 0.431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
